Introduction
The major attacks that in the last two years were committed by members and/ or disciples of Islamic State (is) in notably France, Belgium and Germany raise numerous questions. On the one hand these questions relate to the background, nature and purpose of is and affiliated or similar Islamist terrorist movements as well as to their attractiveness for that many Muslim youngsters from all over the world. On the other hand these questions concern the policies that are needed in order to contain these movements and to prevent as much as possible the large-scale and smaller atrocities that since many years are being perpetrated by their members and supporters. Not only in Western Europe but also in North America, in particular the United States, Russia, Turkey, the Middle East and the Caucasus, Africa, Asia and Australia.
The Origin of the Ideology and Strategy of is
As far as the background, nature and purpose of is and its attacks in Western Europe are concerned, it is not that difficult to recognize immediately the hall-mark of Bin Laden's al-Qaeda. In the preamble of the comprehensive handbook this movement in the nineties composed -the al-Qaeda manual -it made no mistake about its motives, intentions and methods. The hard core of the creed that is being preached in this companion is:
The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the canon and the machine-gun.
The regimes that should be attacked relate to a number of countries in the Middle East but definitely as well as to the Western states that -from the perspective of al-Qaeda -support and protect them, first of all the United States but in its wake equally European states. The overarching aim of the removal, the defeat, the overthrow or the intimidation of all these so-called improper regimes is to create the space for the establishment of a new caliphate. The preamble also makes clear that, with a view to the maximization of their impact, the armed attacks should in particular be committed on public places, "places of amusement, immorality and sin", embassies, economic centers, bridges who connect cities et cetera. In conjunction with this strategy the handbook states that fighters -in order to be successful -have to operate as secret warriors on hostile soil, i.e., they should conceal their residences, provide themselves of false or falsified identity documents, and limit the use of telephones as much as possible. It is therefore no accident that the handbook is to a large extent based on the training manuals for special military forces.1 The attacks that in November 2015 were perpetrated on the Stade de France, some restaurants in the inner-city and the Bataclan in Paris as well as the onslaughts that in March 2016 were staged in Zaventem Airport and Maalbeek subway station in Brussels, seamlessly fit into the ideology and strategy the al-Qaeda leadership developed two decades ago and these days are put into practice by is and related and/or similar Islamist terrorist groupings all over 
